Abstract. The aim of this article is to propose a fully distributed environment for the RSA scheme. What we have in mind is highly sensitive applications and even if we are ready to pay a price in terms of eciency, we do not want any compromise of the security assumptions that we make. Recently Shoup proposed a practical RSA threshold signature scheme that allows to share the ability to sign between a set of players. This scheme can be used for decryption as well. However, Shoup's protocol assumes a trusted dealer to generate and distribute the keys. This comes from the fact that the scheme needs a special assumption on the RSA modulus and this kind of RSA moduli cannot be easily generated in an e cient way with many players. Of course, it is still possible to call theoretical results on multiparty computation, but we cannot hope to design e cient protocols. The only practical result to generate RSA moduli in a distributive manner is Boneh and Franklin's protocol but it seems di cult to modify it in order to generate the kind of RSA moduli that Shoup's protocol requires. The present work takes a di erent path by proposing a method to enhance the key generation with some additional properties and revisits Shoup's protocol to work with the resulting RSA moduli. Both of these enhancements decrease the performance of the basic protocols. However, we think that in the applications we target, these enhancements provide practical solutions. Indeed, the key generation protocol is usually run only once and the number of players used to sign or decrypt is not very large. Moreover, these players have time to perform their task so that the communication or time complexity are not overly important.
the ability to corrupt people and read the memory of servers 6]. These adversaries are stronger than \normal" adversaries that can only read exchanged messages. In a \centralized" cryptosystem, if one break-ins adversary attacks the memory, he then knows all the key and the system is down. As this kind of attacks done by intruders (hackers, Trojan horses) or by corrupted insiders are very common and frequently easy to perform, systems must be protected against them. In threshold cryptography, the secret key is split into shares and each share is given to one of a group of servers. However, in order to be sure that at no moment the key is entirely in one machine, one can also distribute the key generation phase. Consequently, we say that a cryptosystem is fully distributed if it is distributed from the key generation to the signature or decryption phase.
In the case of discrete-log based cryptosystems, known solutions exist to distribute DSS, El Gamal, Cramer- Shoup 20, 38, 7] . Moreover, a protocol to distribute a discrete-log key has been rst proposed by Pedersen in 27] . This protocol has been further revisited to solve a security aw 21, 15] . Therefore, discrete-log cryptosystems are fully distributed. However, a fully distributed version of RSA is a more challenging and important task.
In this paper we propose new techniques to fully distribute RSA. This solves an open problem where one needs to cope with requirements that do not match. On one hand, at Eurocrypt'00, Shoup describes a practical threshold signature scheme in 37] where the primes of the RSA modulus should be safe. On the other hand, Boneh and Franklin at Crypto '97 4] describe a protocol to share the key generation of an RSA modulus. However, the generation of safe modulus seems to be hard with this protocol. The present work takes a di erent path by proposing a method to enhance the key generation with some additional properties and revisits Shoup's protocol to work with the resulting RSA moduli.
Why it is important to share Shoup's threshold RSA ?
Shoup threshold RSA signature scheme 37] presents interesting features. First of all, it is secure and robust in the random oracle model assuming the RSA problem is hard. Next, the signature share generation and veri cation are completely noninteractive and nally, the size of an individual signature share is bounded by a constant times the size of the RSA modulus. However, this scheme requires a trusted dealer to generate the keys and distribute the shares of the secret key among`servers.
When a message m has to be signed by a quorum of at least t + 1 servers, where 2t + 1 `, a special server, called the combiner, forwards the message m or x = H(m) to all servers. Then, each server computes its signature share along with a proof of correctness. Finally, the combiner selects a subgroup of t + 1 servers by checking the proofs and combines the t + 1 related signature shares to generate the signature s. E cient communication model against active adversary. The main characteristic of Shoup's protocol in relation to previous proposals 17, 16, 32] is the following. In the discrete-log case, it is easy to compute inverses mod q, if we note q the order of the group G generated by g, because q is public. With RSA, we cannot disclose inverses of a known value mod '(N) without revealing the factorization of N unless we use a special algebraic structure, called a module, as in 35, 19] . We can note that computations in such structure can be done eciently if we consider 25]. If we do not want to use a module, we face the problem of computing inverses when we use polynomial sharing in order to compute the Lagrange coe cients. Consequently some authors in 17, 32] have proposed additive sharings to avoid this calculation. Therefore, as they need all shares to generate the signature, they devise strategies to cope with corrupted or crashed servers. Di erent strategies can be used to reconstruct the lost shares by noncorrupted servers : either using two di erent sharings (additive and polynomial) as in 32] The main drawbacks of these techniques are the size of the key shares because of the need of di erent sharings and the use of protocols to reconstruct the bad signature shares in the presence of active (malicious) players.
In 16], the authors proposed the rst proven scheme based on polynomial sharing, which is based on Desmedt and Frankel's scheme 13]. However in the case of active adversaries, which are allowed to send bad shares, the protocol has to be rewind at most t times, to remove the bad servers as the signature shares depend on the subgroup of t+1 servers enabling the reconstruction of the 
But, as 0 S i;j 's are not integers and the combiner cannot compute roots modulo a composite number, otherwise it can solve the RSA Problem, he cannot compute equation (2) . The key idea is to note that If the signature is not valid, the combiner removes the bad servers thanks to a proof of robustness, de nes another group S and rewind the protocol. It is then obvious that after t trials, all bad servers are removed from the set S and the signature will be correct. However, this rede nition of the subgroup does not seem very nice and Shoup and others have proposed a new trick to avoid this problem.
Shoup 16] proposed a fully distributed version of RSA, it is less elegant than Shoup's one and it will be nice to share this protocol. Moreover, this scheme proposes others improvements that are valuable such as the proof of robustness. This proof uses safe primes, like Gennaro et al.'s one 20] and avoids the drawbacks of a special relation between prover and veri er. Furthermore, in 16], the authors describe an interactive protocol which leads to a less e cient protocol than Shoup's one which uses non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Therefore, we face the problem of distributing this noninteractive proof.
Proof of robustness and use of safe primes. As we said before, a second key point in Shoup's signature scheme is the proof of correctness, which guarantees the robustness of the scheme. Robustness means that corrupted servers should not be able to prevent uncorrupted servers from signing. This property is attractive for threshold protocols in presence of active adversaries that can modify the behavior of servers. In Shoup's scheme, the proof of correctness requires an RSA modulus built with safe primes. In the proof of correctness, servers must prove that they raise x to the correct power, namely d i , their share of the secret. To this end, each server i has a veri cation key v i = v di mod N and makes a proof that log v v i = log x s i (= d i mod '(N)). The problems are : Z N is not a cyclic group, its order is unknown, such generator v do not exist and elements of maximal order cannot be easily found. However, Shoup noted that if we use RSA moduli with safe primes, then the group of squares in Z N is cyclic and it is easy to nd generators. Consequently, the proof of correctness can be made non-interactively and correctly proved without further assumptions. Finally, safe prime moduli are also used in the key generation protocol in order to guarantee the secrecy of Shamir's secret sharing. 
Outline of the paper
We begin by presenting the problem in section 2, i.e. where the properties of safe primes are used in Shoup's protocol, and in section 3 the security model. Next, in section 4, we describe how to enhance the Boneh-Franklin scheme to generate RSA moduli having special requirements. In section 5 we show that Shoup's protocol is still secure against passive adversary and in section 6, we show a new proof of correctness making Shoup scheme robust against active adversary. Finally, in section 7 we present practical parameters for our scheme.
Notations and De nitions
Throughout this paper, we use the following notation: for any integer N = pq, where n = log(N) is a security parameter, as well as k,`, t, k 0 , k 1 
The problem
As we will see in the following, safe primes are used in the key generation in order to prove that Shamir secret sharing scheme 36] is secure in the ring Z M , and not in a nite eld, and in the proof of correctness. Let us explain the second problem as it is less obvious.
What is the problem ?
Robustness guarantees that even if t malicious players send false signature shares, the signature scheme still correctly generates a signature s. This property is needed since otherwise combination faces the problem of selecting the correct shares.
For example, the combiner receives signature shares from the servers and has to generate the correct signature. One way for him is to pick at random t + 1 signature shares, generate the possible signatures s 0 and test whether s 0 is a valid signature of m. If s 0 passes the veri cation protocol, the correct signature has been found, otherwise, the combiner has to test another group of t + 1 signature shares. Since the combiner cannot guess where the bad shares are, it might face an exponential number of trials. Therefore, it is necessary to devise an e cient test in order to check whether a player has correctly answered a request. Shoup has proposed an e cient proof to achieve such check non-interactively and the same kind of proof appears in 32, 19] but still requires safe prime modulus. In order to avoid the generation of shared safe moduli, which appears currently out of reach, this paper proposes a tradeo between the requirements of the RSA modulus for the signature and decryption protocols and the requirements at key generation. Independly of our work, Damgard and Koprowski have recently considered the same problem in 12]. They revisited Shoup's paper and used non-standard assumptions to show that the proof of correctness works without other requirements on the RSA modulus. They use 18] to generate standard RSA moduli.
In our work, we consider environments where high security is required such as electronic voting schemes. Therefore, we prefer to use protocols based on standard assumptions. We believe that standard assumptions and security proofs are needed to build secure protocols. Several electronic schemes 14, 11, 1] have been based on Paillier cryptosystem which is related to RSA. The techniques developed in the paper can be used to fully share this cryptosystem.
Our results
We prove that Shoup's protocol can be modi ed to work with RSA moduli having special properties under standard assumptions and that these moduli can be jointly generated.
Safe prime moduli are needed in the proof of robustness and in the key generation. Moreover, di erent characteristics of these numbers are used in the proof of robustness. Indeed, Shoup's protocol uses two important properties of the subgroup Q N of squares of Z N when N is a safe modulus. On one hand, this subgroup is cyclic and on the other hand, its order M does not have small prime factors. The cyclic group is used to show the existence of the discrete log in the proof of correctness. The use of safe primes allows to guarantee that, with overwhelming probability, a random element in Q N is a generator. way. These methods allow to keep key generation and signature e cient.
In this paper, we show how to jointly construct RSA moduli such that the subgroup Q N is cyclic, which guarantees the existence of discrete logs and of generators of Q N . Moreover, the order M of this group does not have small prime factors less than some sieving bound B. Checking such primes does not exceedingly increase the running time of the key generation algorithm.
3 Security Model
The Network
We assume a group of`servers connected to a broadcast medium, and that messages sent on the communication channel instantly reach every party connected to it.
The Adversary
The adversary is computationally bounded and it can corrupt servers at any moment by viewing the memories of corrupted servers (passive adversary), and/or modifying their behavior (active adversary). The adversary decides on whom to corrupt at the start of the protocol (static adversary). We also assume that the adversary corrupts no more than t out of`servers throughout the protocol, where` 2t + 1.
Formal de nition
A RSA threshold signature scheme consists of the four following components : { A key generation algorithm takes as input security parameters n,the number k of elements to generate Q N , the number`of signing servers, the threshold parameter t and a random string !; it outputs a public key (N; e) where n is the size in bits of N, the private keys 
Properties of threshold signature schemes
The two properties of a t out of`threshold signature scheme of interest to us are robustness and unforgeability. As we already mentioned, robustness guarantees that even if up to t malicious players send false signature shares, the scheme still returns a correct signature. This property is useful only in the presence of active adversaries.
Unforgeability guarantees that any subset of t+1 players can generate a signature s, but disallows the generation by fewer than t players. This unforgeability property should hold even if some subset of less than t players are corrupted and collude. This property expresses the security of the signature scheme and is useful in the presence of passive or active adversary.
The Games
In this section, we describe the security notions for threshold key generation and threshold signing protocols. We have to show that the information revealed during the key generation and the signing protocols does not release secret information to the adversary.
Game for the threshold key generation. The correctness of the key generation requires that the probability of the secret keys d, p, q, and the public key (N; e) seem be uniformly distributed to the adversary.
The secrecy of the key generation means that if there exists an adversary A which corrupts at most t servers at the beginning of the game, then he cannot obtain more information on the secret key held by uncorrupted players.
Game for the threshold signing protocol. The secrecy of the signing protocol means that if there exists an adversary A which corrupt at most t servers at the beginning of the game and even if he can obtain signatures on messages adaptively chosen, then he cannot forge a signature on a new message. 4 Enhancing the Boneh-Franklin scheme to generate RSA moduli with special requirements
The aim of this section is to generate RSA moduli such that the group of squares is a cyclic group whose order has no small prime factors, namely N = pq, p = 2p 0 +1 and q = 2q 0 +1, gcd(p 0 ; q 0 ) = 1 and no primes p < B divises neither p 0 nor q 0 . In section 6, we will prove that this group can be generated with few random elements. Moreover, we use here a sieving method to simultaneously improve the key generation protocol, the probability of nding a set of generators of Q N , and to make secure Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme. We also present a protocol to compute the GCD of a known value and a shared value and prove the robustness and the secrecy of this new distributed key generation protocol.
A New Distributed RSA modulus Generation
In 4] Boneh and Franklin present a protocol for generating a shared RSA modulus. We describe this protocol here with our adaptation. We have presented here the protocol in the honest-but-curious model. But this protocol can be made robust following 8]. We can also note that this algorithm allows to compute the gcd of a known value and a shared one. We call this protocol the GCD algorithm.
E cient sieving algorithm improving the generation of random number without small factors
In this subsection, we present the sieving algorithm used in phase 1 of proto- In order to also prove that p 0 = p?1 2 has no prime factors less than B, one has to check whether gcd(p?1; P) = gcd(2p 0 ; P) = 1 and gcd(p?1; 4P ) = 2 to test the power of 2. If we denote P 0 by 4P , we can perform a single test gcd(p?1; P 0 ) = 2.
To distribute this test in the honest-but-curious model, the rst server sets its parts p 1 to p 1 ? 1 and we use the distributed GCD protocol described in section 4.2. It is also possible to make this test robust in presence of malicious players as it is explained in appendix 9.1. do not have small prime factors. As the product of cyclic groups whose order are coprime is a cyclic group, the groups of squares in Z p and in Z q are cyclic, and so the group Q N is also cyclic. This allows to guarantee that there exists a cyclic subgroup in Z N of order M = p 0 q 0 .
We can estimate the iteration number of this algorithm with respect to phase 1 of the Boneh-Franklin protocol. First, it is a well-known fact that 
Distributed generation of the keys in Shoup's protocol
Once N is generated, let prime e be the rst prime greater than 4 
Security of Shoup protocol against passive adversary
In this part we show that Shoup's protocol is secure with the RSA moduli generated in previous section against static and passive adversary.
Key Generation
At the end of the key generation protocol, we want to know if the information an adversary can collect, helps him to get useful information on the secret key d. Let . As we are in the honest-but-curious model, the signature s is always correct.
We can prove the following theorem : Theorem 3. In the random oracle model, the signing protocol described above is a secure threshold signature scheme (non-forgeable) assuming the standard RSA signature scheme is secure. Proof. Similar to 37]. u t 6 Enhancing the Shoup scheme against active adversary
The aim of this section is to revisit the proof of correctness originally designed by Shoup to cover the case of RSA moduli generated as in the section 4. This uses a method by which we generate the entire group of squares with few random elements with high probability. 
Proof of correctness

Choice of parameters
In this section we prove that with high probability we generate the entire square group Q N with only few random elements. See appendix section 9.4 for a proof of this theorem.
Practical parameters for the scheme
In the key generation we can test whether p, q, p 0 and q 0 are divisible by small primes B and gcd(p 0 ; q 0 ) = 1. We can assume that B is the rst prime greater than 2 16 . The loss in the key generation phase is a factor 80 on average. Indeed, we have seen in the proof of theorem 2 section 4.4 that , we need u = 6 veri cation keys. Therefore, we need 30 proofs of correctness but is is acceptable in the applications that we have in mind. 8 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have showed how to avoid safe prime RSA modulus in Shoup's proof of robustness such that the proof remains correct. We consider environments where high security is required such as electronic voting schemes, and therefore, we need protocols using standard assumptions and we are ready to pay the price for it.
Basically, we use three di erent techniques allowing to prove that :
{ the group of square is cyclic, { we generate p and q such that p 0 and q 0 do not contain small prime factors, which allows us to generate the group Q N and make Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme secure { we generate a set of generators of Q N by picking at random di erent generators in Q N . Finally, we show how to adapt Shoup proof in order to work with di erent elements that generate Q N instead of a single one. Proof. We begin to show that the distributive version of the key generation is secure against a t-static adversary and then, we will show that this protocol is robust against a t-malicious adversary.
Indistinguishability of data received by the adversary.
In the proof of secrecy, we have to show that if there exists an adversary A which corrupts at most t servers at the beginning of the game, then we can use it to construct an attacker against the centralized version of the key generation protocol in order to factor the modulus N. This attacker is a simulator, whose role is to simulate fake information to the adversary in order to provide him the same information as it will receive in its normal game so that this fake information cannot be distinguished from real ones by the adversary. Therefore, the attacker will be sometimes called the simulator Sim.
Let us consider the following game A :
A1 The attacker chooses to corrupt t servers. He learns all their secret information and actively controls their behavior.
A2
The key generation algorithm is run; the public and secret keys and the veri cation keys are computed.
A3
The adversary tries to factor the RSA modulus based on the information he learned at the key generation or to learn information on the shares of the private key hold by the non corrupted servers.
While the Boneh and Franklin scheme requires to simulate only the public modulus N at key generation, our scheme additionally needs veri cation keys. We begin to prove the security of the RSA modulus. is to prove the secrecy of the RSA modulus assuming the hardness of factoring a non-negligible fraction of the RSA moduli in Z (2) n , where Z (2) n is the set of RSA do not have small prime factors. We have seen in theorem 2 that we decrease the probability by a factor 1=4(e ln(B)). Hence, the result is still valid by replacing 1=4(t + 1) with the Lagrange interpolation formula. Of course, we are not able to nd the missing secret keys but in fact we do not need them. 1 We can note that the distribution of these numbers is not uniform in 2 n?1 2 ; 2 n 2 since the random variable is the sum of`independent and uniform random variables of mean 2 n?3 2 
Proof of theorem 6
In this appendix, we prove the theorem 6. Theorem 5. With probability greater than 1 ? 2 such generator is not overwhelming. Indeed, if we pick a random element v in Q p , the probability that v is a generator of Q p is Pr is a factor of x. From the previous lemma, we know that the probability for a k-tuple of (Q p ) k to generate Q p is ' k (p 0 ) p 0k . Lemma 3 shows that pr is equal to the product 
